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chapter  6
A Historical Mirage
Hakonar saga Hakonarsonar
For when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is 
the soonest winner. (Shakespeare, Henry V, Act 3 , Scene 6)
We are better informed about the circumstances under which Hakonar 
saga was written than in the case of any other king’s saga. The 
so-called “ Formali” (preface) included in the great compilation known 
as Sturlunga saga tells us that the most important and fullest text in 
that collection, Islendinga saga, was the work of Sturla ForSarson:1
Most all the saga events that occurred here in Iceland before Bishop 
Brandr S^mundarson died [1201] had been written down, but those 
saga events that occurred later had not been written down very much 
before the poet Sturla PorSarson recounted “ Islendinga sogur” (the 
sagas of Icelanders). For this purpose he had the insights of wise men 
from his early days and to some extent from writings contemporary 
with the men who figure in the sagas. He himself was able to witness 
and learn of many matters that were major events in his lifetime. We 
rely on his telling with respect to intelligence and trustworthiness, 
because I knew him to be very wise and moderate.
This same Sturla ForSarson is also identified as the author of Hakonar 
saga (see below). He was the (illegitimate) son of ForSr Sturluson, 
who was one of the three most important Sturlung brothers along 
with Snorri Sturluson and Sighvatr Sturluson, who dominated the first 
four decades of the thirteenth century in Iceland. Sturla spent some 
of his early years with his uncle Snorri, and he too became a prolific
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poet and saga writer.2 In addition to Hakonar saga and Islendinga 
saga he edited a version of Landnamabok known as Sturlubok. He 
also wrote a saga about Hakon’s son and successor Magnus lagabretir, 
of which only a fragment survives; he is sometimes credited with 
other books, though with less certainty.3 Hakonar saga is dated very 
precisely between 1263 and 1265 because a passage in the saga states 
that the book was written when Hakon’s successor, King Magnus, had 
ruled for two years (IF 32:159). Islendinga saga is thought to have 
been written rather later, closer to 1280.4
The writing of Hakonar saga was commissioned not by King Hakon 
himself but by his son Magnus. The circumstances are related in a 
short, ten-page text titled “ Sturlu ^attr” and included in Sturlunga 
saga (II, 227-36). We are told that when King Hakon was out of the 
country campaigning in Scotland, Sturla learned that his son Magnus 
was now in charge of Norway. He fears the enmity of King Hakon and 
thinks that his chances might be better with Magnus.5 Accordingly he 
sails to Bergen, but Magnus gives him less than a cordial reception, 
promising only to refrain from killing him, then deciding that Sturla 
should accompany him on a voyage south.
The first night the crewmen cast about for some entertainment, and 
Sturla accommodates them by reciting an otherwise unknown story 
called “ Huldar saga.” The crewmen crowd about and give the recital 
a warm reception. In the meantime Magnus’s queen Ingilborg, who is 
Danish by birth, becomes aware of what is afoot. The following day 
she sends for Sturla and asks him to perform an encore. He proceeds 
to recite much of the day, earning another enthusiastic response. 
Under the queen’s influence Magnus’s icy attitude begins to thaw and 
he allows Sturla to recite a poem in honor of King Hakon. This too 
gets a warm reception and Magnus goes so far as to say (II, 234): “ I 
think you declaim better than the pope.” Sturla is now allowed to 
make his case, and Magnus becomes reconciled. He promises to take 
Sturla’s part when King Hakon returns, and harmony is restored. 
Magnus includes Sturla in his close consultations and “assigned him 
the task of composing the saga of his father King Hakon, according 
to his own lights and the account of the wisest men” (II, 234). A 
direct confrontation with King Hakon is avoided because the news is 
received that the king has died in Orkney.
Partly because of the praise accorded him in the “ Formali,”
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partly because of the literary and diplomatic skills attributed to him 
in “ Sturlu ^attr,” and partly because of his persistent neutrality in 
Islendinga saga, Sturla BorSarson has acquired a special reputation as 
a trustworthy narrator. If we add to these acknowledgments the fact 
that Hakonar saga is a record of recent events and appears to be based 
on first-hand testimony, it will come as no surprise that this saga has 
sometimes been considered the most historically reliable of all the 
kings’ sagas.6 The text may in fact be quite reliable with respect to such 
matters as chronology and the identity of the persons involved in the 
action. But we will see that there are reasons to suspect a far-reaching 
bias and partisanship in the depiction of King Hakon’s character and 
his relationship with the Icelanders. The often proclaimed neutrality 
of Islendinga saga may not be a quality transferable to Hakonar saga 
for the simple reason that the latter, like Sverris saga, was written on 
royal commission and was subject to royal approval.7
Hakonar saga and Islendinga saga are not comparable works. One 
served political interests, but the other looks more like a personal 
memoir. Memoirs are of course also subject to bias and partisanship, 
but Islendinga saga does not seem to have the political one-sidedness 
that we find in Hakonar saga. Armann Jakobsson has argued that 
Sturla BorSarson conceived of Islendinga saga as a deterrent to the 
internecine strife that bedeviled Iceland in the thirteenth century.8 
That is certainly a possible reading, but it seems less palpable than the 
idealization of King Hakon in Hakonar saga. Islendinga saga seems 
to accept bloodshed as a fact of contemporary history, but Hakonar 
saga stands in almost militant opposition to bloodshed.
Before considering this contradiction we should take note of the 
fact that these two sagas are compositionally antithetical. We saw in 
previous chapters that the sagas about early Icelanders and the kings’ 
sagas are constructed in different ways. The former recapitulate serial 
confrontations culminating in a dramatic resolution. Valla-Ljots saga 
outlines Halli SigurSarson’s challenge to the local leadership and 
death, then works up to a tense face-off between the great chieftains 
GuSmundr riki and Ljotr Ljotolfsson. Viga-Glums saga recounts 
Glumr Eyjolfsson’s rise to chieftainly status and his contentions with 
both local and extraterritorial neighbors. In Reykd&la saga, on the 
other hand, Askell Eyvindarson’s role is not to provoke conflict but 
to resolve differences with chieftainly diplomacy, but he nonetheless
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succumbs to wounds inflicted in an armed encounter. Ljosvetninga 
saga is largely about the discountenancing of the chieftain GuSmundr 
riki and the counterbalancing vengeance he takes against three 
successive antagonists. All four of these stories are seen in terms of 
overt conflict and personal status. The action of Sturla BorSarson's 
Islendinga saga is cast similarly as a series of preliminary battles at 
ViSines, HelgastaSir, Holar, on Grimsey, at GillastaSir, at SauSafell, in 
Hundadalr, at Brer, and at Skalaholt, all leading up to the cataclysmic 
battle at OrlygsstaSir. This too is a story of mounting tensions and a 
memorable finale.
If Sturla had chosen this type of structure for Hakonar saga, he 
would have focused more intently on the conflict between Hakon 
and Skuli, but we have seen that the kings’ sagas subscribe to a 
different sense of form. They are either chronologically constructed 
(Ari, Sremundr, the synoptics, and the great compilatons) or they are 
biographically organized (the sagas of Olafr Tryggvason and Olafr 
Haraldsson and Sverris saga). In Hakonar saga Sturla BorSarson 
chose, or was commissioned to elect, the biographical option in 
imitation of Sverris saga. This was the logical solution because Hakon 
had the longest reign of any medieval Norwegian king (4 6 years), and 
there was no dearth of narrative material. Within the biographical 
frame the ordering is explicitly chronological; Sturla systematically 
notes the passage of each year during Hakon’s reign. He was also 
destined to carry a chronological consciousness over to Islendinga 
saga, which is more rigorously chronological than the sagas about 
early Icelanders.
The chronological structure makes it easier to summarize the action 
phase by phase. The saga tells us a great deal about Hakon’s birth 
and childhood, inspired no doubt by the story of Olafr Tryggvason’s 
imperiled infancy, to which it refers specifically (IF 31:176). The 
story then turns to the political contest for the throne. It is not at 
all clear why Hakon emerges as the favored candidate. His faction, 
the Birkibeinar, seems to have been stronger than the other factions, 
but an explanation of their superiority is not provided.9 After his 
installation in 12 17  he must contend with dissident groups in the 
east, the Baglar and Slittungar, but since he is very young (born in 
1204), the military action must have been largely in the hands of field 
commanders. Another group of dissidents, the Ribbungar, must be
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dealt with between 12 18  and 1227, but that threat dissipates when 
their leader dies. Hakon would now appear to be secure, were it not 
for the presence of Skuli BarSarson, the brother of the deceased king 
Ingi BarSarson, and a strong opposition candidate for the throne.
An uncomfortable relationship between Hakon and Skuli persists 
down to Skuli’s death in 1240. This relationship is one of the more 
problematical features of the saga. An attempt is made to manage the 
potential conflict by making Skuli a jarl (IF 31:190), by giving him a 
third of Norway (IF 31:267), and by arranging a marriage engagement 
between Hakon and Skuli’s daughter Margreta (IF 31:227), but there is 
continuing friction. It has been pointed out that the author of the saga 
was in a delicate position because his patron, King Magnus, was the 
son of King Hakon but also the son-in-law of Jarl Skuli.10 The author 
therefore needed to tread a fine line in finding a way to authenticate 
Hakon’s position and status without detracting too obviously from 
Skuli’s standing. He does so by claiming that the two men got on well 
as long as they were together, but that when they were separated, evil 
men availed themselves of the opportunity to draw them apart with 
slander (IF 32:18, 32, 52). The reader is left with the sense that this 
explanation involves the understating of a quite troubled relationship 
and that Skuli probably never abandoned his claim to the throne. He 
maintains secret communications with foreign powers that are never 
explained (e.g., IF 31:199). Ultimately he reasserts his claim and takes 
up arms, only to be defeated and killed by the Birkibeinar.
Although Skuli eventually succumbs, it is clear that the author 
allows for no hint of personal animosity between Hakon and Skuli. 
Hakon is not present at Skuli’s killing, as the text carefully specifies, 
and that appears to be part of Sturla’s overall policy of preserving the 
king from any involvement in killing whatsoever. He does not commit 
killings in battle and is in fact kept rather remote from the battlefield in 
general. His role is to issue commands, not to engage in the fray. Nor 
does he order executions, with one particularly significant exception 
(IF 31:316). On this occasion he orders that one of the Birkibeinar 
be executed because he has been ospakr (undisciplined), perhaps 
guilty of pillaging. It is this episode that prompted the epigraph at the 
beginning of the present chapter, words taken from a scene in which 
Shakespeare’s Henry V approves the hanging of Bardolph because he 
has plundered a church object (Act III, Scene V):
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We would have all such offenders so cut off: and we give express charge 
that in our marches through the country there be nothing compelled 
from the villages, nothing taken but paid for, none of the French 
upbraided or abused in disdainful language; for when lenity and 
cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner.
King Henry’s point is not to alienate the civilian population in an area 
where military actions are being conducted. We will see that this is 
one of the underlying themes in Hakonar saga as well. Sturla makes 
only this single exception to his idealized portrait of a merciful king, 
but the exception serves to emphasize that Hakon is dedicated to the 
protection of his civilian population. He therefore incurs no blame.
Far from being guilty of bloodshed, Hakon is described time 
and again as being eager to grant grid (amnesty), especially if it is 
requested. His role is not to kill but to pardon, and this propensity is 
recorded ten times.11 His inclination to spare lives extends to Iceland 
as well. When Sturla Sighvatsson visits him in 1234 and discusses the 
unification of Iceland, Hakon is distressed by the news of unrest and 
urges moderation (IF 32:25): “ The king said that the country should 
not be won at the cost of killing and advised him [Sturla] to capture 
men and send them abroad or appropriate their territory by other 
means if he could.” When Snorri Sturluson’s son Ormkja visits the 
Norwegian court with more news of unrest, the king expresses the 
fear that Sturla has proceeded more aggressively than the king had 
advised (IF 32:36). The saga makes it sound as though Hakon takes 
a deeper interest in the safety of the Icelanders than the Icelanders 
themselves.
Hakon’s compassionate outlook is also emphasized on the occasion 
of Snorri Sturluson’s killing in 12 4 1. When Snorri’s son Ormkja 
appears before the king in 124 2 , Hakon forgives him for leaving 
Norway without royal permission, but he adds that because of his 
disobedience he deserves to die more than his father Snorri did. He 
goes on to say that “his father would not have died if he had come 
to meet with me” (IF 32:119). The king’s words raise difficulties. In 
the first place, Hakon, who is consistently described as being averse 
to execution and regularly avoids it, does not hesitate to discuss the 
option in this passage. In the second place, we know from a passage 
in Islendinga saga (I, 453) that King Hakon sent letters to Iceland
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specifying that Snorri should either be sent to Norway or be killed. In 
other words, he orders an execution unless Snorri does his bidding. 
It is part of the cleansing of Hakon’s image that this information is 
suppressed in Hakonar saga. In the latter source the responsibility for 
Snorri’s killing is shifted to his political enemies in Iceland. Hakonar 
saga states in so many words that Gizurr Forvaldsson is the killer 
(IF 32:119): “ That same autumn Gizurr Forvaldsson killed Snorri 
Sturluson at Reykjaholt in Iceland.” It seems that the reader is being 
put off the scent and that King Hakon is being cleared of guilt.12
This possibility raises the question whether King Hakon’s mercy 
is more an authorial stance than a reality. The stance is reinforced by 
the repeated instances of amnesty and the fact that the king’s merciful 
outlook is not entirely shared by Jarl Skuli. Hakon is kept aloof from 
the fighting, and on the one occasion on which he seems closest to the 
fighting, his compassion is specifically noted (IF 32:107):
As fierce as King Hakon had been during the day in destroying his
enemies, it was no less exceptional how merciful he was afterward in
the granting of amnesty to all those who submitted to his authority.
The saga also reminds us that he enacted his mercy in revisions of the 
law (IF 32:265): “ He put an end to all killings and foot-hewing within 
the country, and hand-hewings as well, unless there was adequate 
justification.” Although Hakon is merciful in both policy and practice, 
Skuli is not exempted to the same extent. He can be present at killings 
(e.g., IF 31:244, 246), or he orders killings (e.g., IF 3 1:2 53 ; IF 32:55). 
In one case he hangs a man (IF 3 1:2 7 1)  and in a particularly egregious 
case his followers, the Varbelgir, grant a man amnesty and then kill 
him anyway (IF 32:56).
It is only Hakon who is completely exonerated, but can we believe 
that he is as irreproachable as he appears? Or is his carefully managed 
portrait a retrospective improvement on a more mixed original? We 
can be quite sure that Hakon bears at least partial responsibility 
for Snorri Sturluson’s death and, harking back to “ Sturlu ^attr,” we 
might ask why Sturla ForSarson was so apprehensive about appearing 
before Hakon if the king was in fact so reliably merciful. He has 
been seen as a steady advocate of peace, but perhaps the saga makes 
the point a little too insistently in order to obscure the real Hakon.
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King Hakon was not the sort of peaceable stay-at-home exemplified 
by Olafr kyrri at the end of the eleventh century. On the contrary, 
he seems to have conducted a very vigorous, even aggressive, foreign 
policy. He raised large armies against Denmark and Sweden, but had 
the good fortune to arrive at settlements before it came to armed 
conflict. He reached out to the Holy Roman Empire and Spain as no 
previous Norwegian monarch had done. He organized a huge fleet 
to reconquer the Celtic possessions that the notoriously aggressive 
Magnus berfrettr had annexed around 110 0  (IF 32:257). Despite the 
protestations of peace, it seems quite clear that Iceland was also on 
Hakon’s territorial wish list.13
If Hakon’s portrait appears in a sanitized version in his saga, we 
may ask who is responsible for the retrospective idealization. There is 
some reason to suspect that it is not the work of Sturla EorSarson, not 
only because of the hostile relationship described in “ Sturlu ^attr” but 
also because we can evaluate Sturla’s writing practices from his other 
large book, Islendinga saga. The style of this latter book is anything 
but idealizing. It is a notoriously sanguinary account of the conflicts 
in Iceland in the thirteenth century and is unsparing in its depiction 
of violence. Einar Olafur Sveinsson famously tried to relativize the 
violence by emphasizing the cultural achievement of the Sturlung 
Age. He noted the estimate of 350 killings in the period and found 
that number not inordinate.14 But the recurrent descriptions of how 
men are dragged out of their houses or otherwise captured and then 
maimed or executed in cold blood are truly chilling. There are 42 
such scenes in Islendinga saga with a total loss of life amounting to 
76 and no attempt at extenuation.15 This practice is so contrary to the 
authorial stance in Hakonar saga that we might well wonder whether 
the same author is at work, but it seems certain that both books were 
written by Sturla EorSarson.
The answer to the puzzle can be extrapolated from a paper by Olafia 
Einarsdottir (note 7), who observed that the composition of Hakonar 
saga is likely to have been influenced by a changed political outlook 
under King Magnus and a retreat from the expansionist ambitions 
of King Hakon. The true “ friSarkonungur” (peace-loving king), to 
use Armann Jakobsson’s term, may have been King Magnus rather 
than his father, although Magnus, at the age of 25, may have been 
too young to bear the sole responsibility for a historical reorientation.
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His circle may have had an interest not only in idealizing the recently 
deceased Hakon but also in projecting a more peaceful policy into 
the recent past so as to give Norwegian foreign policy overall an air 
of consistency.
The influence of the court circle on the composition of Hakonar 
saga would in any case have been considerable. Although Sturla had 
composed at least one poem about King Hakon and would have 
learned something about his activities from relatives and visiting 
Norwegians in Iceland, he was newly arrived in Norway in 1263 and 
would have been entirely dependent on his Norwegian contacts for 
the details of his narrative.16 The saga text contains a host of place 
names and personal names that would have been unfamiliar to him 
in advance. It seems unlikely that this detailed information would 
have been transmitted to him without also transmitting a political 
outlook. The orientation of the text must therefore be as much the 
work of the court as of the author. As “ Sturlu ^attr” tells us, Sturla 
had gone to great pains to ingratiate himself at court, and it is unlikely 
that he would have squandered this effort by adopting an unapproved 
perspective in his formulation of Hakon’s life.
A Norwegian and royalist outlook would have been nothing novel 
in the succession of kings’ sagas. Such an orientation had begun with 
Sverris saga in 118 5-8 8 , some eighty years earlier. Sverris saga is 
quoted in Hakonar saga (IF 32:91), was read to Hakon on his deathbed 
(IF 32:262), and is generally thought to be the most proximate model 
for Hakonar saga.17 The later saga differs from its model by devoting 
more space to Hakon’s birth and childhood and holding him more 
aloof from the fighting, but it has the same exclusive focus on a royal 
protagonist and the same interest in promoting an exaggeratedly 
positive image of him.
We have seen that Fagrskinna from ca. 1225 is an equally telling 
example of a Norwegian focus. It looks like a direct response to the 
Icelandic orientation in Morkinskinna, which is peopled by a large 
number of Icelandic figures whose presence sometimes compromises 
the Norwegian king. In Fagrskinna, on the other hand, there is a 
virtual exclusion of Icelanders despite the citation of over 250 
Icelandic skaldic stanzas. We saw above (p. 66) that there is in fact 
just one reference to the Icelanders in a comment on the poems they 
presented to King Haraldr har9 ra9 i (IF 29:261). Although the author
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made use of as many as nine Icelandic prose accounts, he mentions 
none of them.
Not only does the author of Fagrskinna suppress these sources, but 
we may remind ourselves that he is at pains to make the Norwegian 
kings better than they were in the Icelandic originals (pp. 67-69). 
Haraldr harfagri is freed from the charges of tyranny that haunt 
him in Heimskringla and Egils saga. Eirikr bloSox’s cognomen is 
explained not from the fratricide attributed to him elsewhere but 
from a more neutral viking activity. In other sources Hakon goSi 
is criticized for his participation in a heathen sacrificial ritual in 
Mrerr, but in Fagrskinna his participation is characterized only as 
an expression of good will (IF 29:80). Fagrskinna does not dwell on 
Hakon jarl’s paganism and suppresses the ugly details of his death 
in a pigsty. In the story of Olafr Tryggvason the author draws on 
Oddr Snorrason’s Olafs saga Tryggvasonar but eliminates all the 
conversion atrocities in that account. Haraldr harSraSi, who is deeply 
problematical in Morkinskinna, undergoes a complete transformation. 
As Gustav Indrebo wrote a hundred years ago: “ It is hard to point out 
an episode or a single sentence that contains anything negative about 
King Haraldr.” 18
Thus Hakonar saga appears to be firmly lodged in a pro-Norwegian, 
pro-royal tradition going back to Sverris saga and Fagrskinna. The 
use of Sverris saga is manifest, and if it is true that the “konungatal” 
that was read to King Hakon on his deathbed should be identified 
as Fagrskinna, then we may guess that such a pro-royal bias was 
agreeable to the dying king.19 The preference for a Norwegian 
perspective could very well have revived in Hakonar saga and served 
to exalt the monarch even above the level reached in Sverris saga and 
Fagrskinna. To what extent Hakon really deserves the designation 
“ friSarkonungur” is hard to know, but we can readily believe that he 
would have been flattered to be seen in this way and that his successor 
Magnus would have been eager to promote the flattery. The portrait 
painted in Hakonar saga may therefore be less historical than it is 
unabashedly panegyric.
Icelandic historians and literary historians have naturally taken 
a special interest in the relationship between King Hakon and the 
medieval commonwealth of Iceland, to which Hakon put an end in 
1262-64. After a period of vigorous disparagement of King Hakon’s
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perceived aggression against Iceland there followed a revisionist view 
of the king in an influential paper by Armann Jakobsson and to some 
extent in the introductions to the recent Islenzk fornrit edition of 
Hakonar saga written by Sverrir Jakobsson and horleifur Hauksson.20 
These scholars are inclined to make the Icelandic chieftains more 
accountable for Iceland’s submission to Norwegian rule than King 
Hakon. Thus the historical perspective on Iceland’s annexation has 
changed from an emphasis on external aggression to an emphasis on 
internal collapse.
Armann rejects the condemnation of King Hakon common in an 
earlier generation and provides a reading of Hakonar saga that casts 
Hakon more as an implement of the Icelandic chieftains than as a 
fomenter of hostilities. He lists the traditional charges against Hakon 
under five headings (p. 169):
1. That he aimed to acquire rule from the outset and operated for 
some time in secret.
2. That he provoked hostilities in Iceland to achieve his goals.
3. That he set the Icelandic chieftains against each other.
4. That the Icelanders submitted mistakenly and not from necessity 
or in concert; in reality they acted against the will of the majority 
of their countrymen.
5. That the king imposed foreign bishops to smooth the way for 
his takeover.
Charges 2-4 can be dismissed for lack of hard evidence, but charges 
1 and 5 can be supported from the text. Armann argues that Snorri 
Sturluson (in 1220) and Sturla Sighvatsson (in 1234) were not sent 
to Iceland as the king’s agents so much as they were motivated by 
their own ambitions.21 He also argues that King Hakon does not bear 
the responsibility for Snorri’s killing.22 He does not devote special 
attention to the role of the Norwegian bishops in Iceland, but we will 
see that there are reasons to believe that they were complicit.
I believe that there is still a case to be made for outside aggression 
on the part of King Hakon, both in terms of historical precedent 
and from a close reading of Hakonar saga. Norwegian kings had 
long taken a strong hand in Icelandic affairs. Olafr Tryggvason 
seems clearly to have been implicated in the conversion of Iceland
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to Christianity. Olafr Haraldsson was notoriously interested in 
acquiring Iceland, and Adam of Bremen would have us believe that 
Haraldr SigurSarson (harSraSi) cast an acquisitive eye in the same 
direction.23 It was perhaps only the truly peaceable nature of Olafr 
kyrri in the late eleventh century and the internal disputing of the 
Norwegian throne in the twelfth century that deflected the attention 
of the Norwegian kings from their Atlantic outpost. As soon as the 
dissensions between Baglar and Birkibeinar were brought under 
control, Norwegian ambitions abroad were rekindled. That may mean 
that such ambitions were never really forgotten, and they would surely 
have been exacerbated by the trade hostilities between Iceland and 
Norway in the period 12 15 -2 0 .24 These troubles persuade Jarl Skuli 
to send an expedition to Iceland (IF 31:229), and he gathers a great 
fleet, but “ the men were very unenthusiastic about the expedition” 
and Snorri Sturluson tries to dissuade the king (IF 31:230). The king, 
at the age of 17, then delivers a prudent dissent:
“ Sir Jarl,” he said, “ the intention voiced here during the summer does 
not appear to the council (radinu) to be wise, to wit that an army should 
be dispatched to Iceland, for such a mission seems problematical. That 
country [Iceland] was settled from here, and our kin and ancestors 
Christianized the country and gave their countrymen an excellent new 
start. Most of the people are blameless with respect to us, though some 
of them have done our citizens harm. But it will be to everybody’s 
disadvantage if the land is ravaged.“
This is clearly not the teenage king’s spur-of-the-moment reaction. 
It is a policy statement reached by consultation with “ the council.” 
It emphasizes common kinship and common religion, and the 
“disadvantage” of all concerned if there is an armed confrontation. 
The “disadvantage” is not specified, but it may be a euphemism for 
the difficult prospects of a transatlantic war with the accompanying 
problems of provisioning and resupply, quite apart from the alienation 
of a whole population and the probability that such an alienation 
would diminish any prospect of annexation. If this understanding 
of the words is correct, it suggests that the topic of annexation is not 
altogether new despite the phrasing. The text reads (IF 31:230): “ This 
was the first time it was discussed by the jarl that Snorri should bring
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the country [Iceland] under the king’s rule.” The text does not say that 
this was the first time the king’s rule was discussed, only that it was 
the first time it was discussed with Snorri. In other words, the plan 
may have been of quite long standing, and it was now only a question 
of how and with whom to implement it.
The reference to “ the council” suggests that there was a definite 
plan in place, and that plan seems to have anticipated Hakon’s later 
actions exactly. The plan was not to alienate the Icelanders with overt 
military moves but to offer the chieftains incentives to collaborate 
with the Norwegian king. Such a plan explains Hakon’s repeated 
indications that he is the friend of the Icelanders and his repeated 
efforts to enlist chieftains in his attempt to extend his rule. Armann 
Jakobsson, Sverrir Jakobsson, and borleifur Hauksson have argued 
that Hakon’s serious ambition to annex Iceland dates from William 
of Sabina’s visit to Norway in 1247 and his comment that Iceland’s 
kingless state was anomalous, but the plan seems already to have been 
in place in 1220  when it was discussed with Snorri Sturluson.25 This 
might lead us to believe that annexation was not so much the teenage 
king’s plan as a state plan, although King Hakon was destined to play 
the role of the iron fist in the velvet glove in due course.
Any implementation of the plan was necessarily deferred until the 
conclusion of the campaigns against the Baglar, the Slittungar, and 
the Ribbungar down to 1227, as well as the first campaign in the 
western islands (in the Hebrides and the Isle of Man) in 12 3 0 -3 1  
(IF 32:10-16). There were also strains between the king and Jarl Skuli 
to be dealt with (IF 32:18-23). Eventually, however, King Hakon can 
return to the Icelandic project and does so on the occasion of Sturla 
Sighvatsson’s visit to Norway in 1234. Sturla reports to King Hakon, 
who is displeased to hear of the hostilities in Iceland (IF 32:25). He 
therefore asks how difficult it would be to achieve unification (einvald, 
“ single rule” ) and says that it would be more peaceful if just one 
man were largely in charge of matters (“ let ^a mundu verSa friSbetra 
ef einn reS mestu” ). Sturla answers that there would not be much 
difficulty if the man were hard-working and intelligent (“ harSyrkr 
ok raSugr” ). Hakon then asks him if he would take the job, and “ he 
said that he would risk it with the king’s counsel and supervision,” 
and with whatever honor the king would deem appropriate if he could 
bring it about. The king adds that the land should not be won with
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killings but that Sturla should assert authority with other means and 
should capture men and send them back to Norway if he could. The 
text goes on to say that the king and Sturla had frequent discussions 
about this matter during the winter.
The slightly veiled talk about “ single rule” hardly disguises the 
idea that Hakon is to be the single ruler and that Sturla should be at 
most his jarl. The codicil that there should be no killings is of course 
in line with the king’s rhetorical strategy of casting himself as the 
special friend of the Icelanders. This stance is reinforced two years 
later in 1236 when Sturla’s antagonist and cousin Ormkja comes to 
Norway and reports to the king that the hostilities in Iceland are 
worse than ever (IF 32:36): “ The king considered that Sturla had 
conducted himself more harshly than he had counseled him.” The 
success or failure of the annexation plan has clearly become the 
king’s ongoing concern, but no further measures can be taken for the 
moment because of Skuli’s overt claim to the throne (IF 32:52-116) 
and the aftermath of his death in 1240.
The next explicit reference to annexation comes in 1247 when 
Cardinal William of Sabina comes to Norway and crowns King 
Hakon. Armann Jakobsson and the recent recent editors of Hakonar 
saga treat this as the crucial moment in the history of the annexation, 
and the text bears close scrutiny. The key passage comes at the 
beginning of a new chapter and reads as follows (IF 32:136):
The following arrangement was made for Iceland with the cardinal’s 
advice, to wit that the people who lived there should serve King Hakon, 
because he [the cardinal] thought it inappropriate that a country 
should not serve under a king like all other countries in the world. 
ForSr kakali was then sent with Bishop Heinrekr. They were to convey 
this message to the general population, namely that all men should 
consent to the authority of King Hakon and to such tax payments as 
were honorable for them.
It should be pointed out that the text does not say that it was the 
cardinal’s idea that Iceland should have a king like every other 
country. Indeed, we might wonder why the cardinal should have any 
special interest in Iceland’s governance. What we do know is that 
King Hakon and his circle had had that special interest at least since
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Snorri Sturluson’s visit in 1220  and that he had commissioned Sturla 
Sighvatsson to institute einvald (single rule) in 1234. It therefore seems 
quite likely that the idea was King Hakon’s and that he raised it with 
the cardinal in the hope of getting support from Rome. The meeting 
with Cardinal William was the occasion of several concessions to 
King Hakon’s special interests, in addition to his coronation, and 
agreement to monarchical rule in Iceland would have been the least 
of these concessions.26
Any remnant of Sturla Sighvatsson’s commission to unify Iceland 
expired in 1238 when he fell in the battle at OrlygsstaSir. There was 
hence a considerable lapse in the plan for annexation. The most likely 
aspirant in Iceland was Gizurr fiorvaldsson, who emerged victorious 
in the battle at OrlygsstaSir and later survived the counterattack 
at Flugumyrr in 1252. Gizurr visited King Hakon in 1246  and 
submitted his case to the king’s discretion, but there is no discussion 
of annexation. Gizurr may have been perceived as too deeply involved 
in Icelandic factionalism to qualify as a force for unification. He also 
carried out the killing of Snorri Sturluson in 12 4 1, and we have seen 
that King Hakon was reluctant to associate himself with that event. 
But that a pacified Iceland under one rule continued to be a priority 
for King Hakon is indicated by events in 1250 (IF 32:156):
That summer many Icelanders were with King Hakon, as was previ­
ously written, and many meetings were held about what arrangement 
should be made for the country [Iceland]. The upshot was that Bishop 
Heinrekr and Gizurr and fiorgils skarSi were sent to Iceland and were 
appointed to those regions in Iceland to which the king had taken title. 
They were charged to convey the king’s message to other men in the 
country. The sons of S^mundr [Jonsson at Oddi] took another ship 
to Iceland, and they had given over their followings to the king with 
handclasps.
This passage is revealing because it shows that King Hakon had 
not been idle since the death of his agent Sturla Sighvatsson but had 
laid claim to some areas and had taken over the followings of certain 
chieftains. The relative understatement of these acquisitions again 
indicates that the king did not want to appear in an aggressive role. 
That Gizurr was in his service and scheduled for a reward is confirmed
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in 1255 when Hakon gives him a command in Frandheimr (IF 32:170). 
At the same time he sends Ivarr Englason to Iceland to back his cause 
(“ flytja sitt erendi” ) with the assistance of the bishops, “ because the 
king had confidence in both of them” (IF 32:170). Ivarr spends the 
winter in Skalaholt and finds Bishop SigvarSr’s efforts somewhat 
deficient, but he goes on to SkagafjgrSr and pursues the king's aims 
in collaboration with Bishop Heinrekr and Forgils skarSi, who had 
become the leader in SkagafjgrSr. Heinrekr and Forgils assemble all 
the local farmers and, together with Ivarr, urge the king’s bidding. The 
men of SkagafjgrSr and EyjafjgrSr and most of the men in the North 
Quarter agree to pay the king taxes, but Ivarr nonetheless returns to 
Norway with the feeling that he has accomplished less than he hoped. 
He blames Gizurr and ForSr kakali for the shortfall. Despite Ivarr’s 
dissatisfaction this passage indicates that Hakon is making progress; 
he has transferred the mission from deputized Icelandic chieftains to a 
Norwegian plenipotentiary and has won broad agreement to taxation 
in the north.
The next phase of the move toward monarchy comes in 1258 when 
the king reauthorizes Gizurr Forvaldsson’s mission (IF 32:203):
With him [the king] was Gizurr Forvaldsson. The king arranged to 
send Gizurr out to Iceland and gave him the title of jarl. In return 
Gizurr promised to pacify the land and have all the farmers pay taxes 
to the king as he had previously asked. Gizurr made much of the pros­
pect that he would achieve this easily.
The king sends his retainer Foraldi hviti with him to monitor his 
progress, and additional ships with many other trusted servants of 
the king also make the voyage to ascertain whether Gizurr is living up 
to his promises. Gizurr urges the case with many commitments and is 
able to gain the adherence of many “good men” who swear allegiance 
to King Hakon. They soon learn that Gizurr has misrepresented the 
king’s words, but, asserts the author, they nonetheless remained loyal 
to the king. At this point the story is abbreviated (IF 32:204): “ There 
are many tales about the dealings of the jarl and the Icelanders, which 
it is not necessary to write down in this account.” It was perhaps 
neither necessary nor politic to delve too far into this final phase of 
the king’s tightening grip.27 We are told that the king spent the winter
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of 1259-60  in Bergen. He had learned the previous summer that Jarl 
Gizurr had not focused much attention on representing his cause to 
the Icelanders. He reacts by dispatching documents to the alpingi 
specifying how much tax he wanted and what the jarl should have 
(IF 32:207). These documents are in the care of two courtiers and 
were read at the alpingi, but they caused much contention; the 
southerners, who were friendly toward Gizurr, and the people east 
of Fjorsa were most opposed to taxation. The demands therefore 
came to nothing.
The following year in 126 1 the king dispatches HallvarSr gullskor 
to BorgarfjprSr to urge the case once more and press the jarl to 
action. HallvarSr has greater success, and the farmers commit to a 
large sum of money. HallvarSr is credited with a handsome response 
to the effect that (IF 32:222-23) “ the king did not wish that the 
farmers should be afflicted with such great payments; he said that 
the king wished the allegiance of the farmers and whatever land 
taxes that it would cost them no excessive burden to pay.” Despite 
the king’s increasingly insistent demands, his rhetorical posture of 
good will toward the Icelanders remains the same. Jarl Gizurr resists 
at first, but eventually there is a preponderance of acceptance in the 
north and west, so that everyone agrees to the king’s terms except the 
southerners east of Fjorsa and the people from the East Fjord region.
Recent expositions have tended to underplay the resistance to 
King Hakon’s campaign. That resistance is usually expressed in the 
form of royal dissatisfaction with the progress being made. As early 
as Snorri Sturluson’s mission of 1220  we are told that (IF 31:231) 
“ Snorri made no progress with his countrymen, and he did not 
press the point.” Sturla Sighvatsson makes no progress in 1234, but 
whether that is to be explained by resistance or lack of exertion is not 
made clear. In 1250 King Hakon begins to send Norwegian agents 
to verify the progress made by Icelandic volunteers. The first of 
these is Ivarr Englason. He finds the efforts made by Bishop SigvarSr 
Fettmarsson inadequate, and when he returns to Norway, he blames 
Gizurr Forvaldsson and For9 r kakali for the lack of progress. In 1258 
King Hakon sends a large number of observers, and they clearly 
report to the king that Gizurr has not effectively represented him. 
Gizurr’s resistance is made explicit at the end of the account, and 
the disagreement between northerners and southerners reinforces the
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point. Since the saga was written from a Norwegian point of view, 
it no doubt understates Icelandic resistance, but enough indications 
survive to assure us that the imposition of Norwegian rule was no 
easy matter. The Icelanders seem to have played a waiting game, 
hoping that the issue would dissolve. The chieftains, inspired by a 
combination of political acquiescence and political ambition, appear 
to collaborate with the king, but once at home, they find that their 
countrymen are of a different mind or that other priorities are more 
compelling.
The history of Icelandic-Norwegian interaction in the thirteenth 
century is probably not a story of Icelandic chieftains courting the 
king’s favor but a story of gradual Norwegian incursions. Snorri 
Sturluson (1220), Sturla Sighvatsson (1234), and Gizurr borvaldsson 
together with borgils skarSi (1250) are dispatched as the king’s agents, 
but they disappoint the king by making little progress. Hakon brings 
more pressure to bear by appointing Norwegian bishops in whom he 
has confidence, Heinrekr Karsson in 1247 and SigvarSr bettmarsson 
in 1254. That they are intended to work for King Hakon’s cause is 
indicated by the fact that SigvarSr’s efforts are found wanting (IF 
32:170). Beginning in 1250 King Hakon supplements his measures 
by sending Norwegian officials to implement his plans. The first of 
these is Ivarr Englason, who finds fault with Bishop SigvarSr and 
with the Icelandic chieftains in his report to the king (IF 32 :170 -7 1). 
In 1258 the king sends his official boraldi hviti and many unnamed 
agents to monitor progress (IF 32:203). Finally in 126 1 he appoints 
HallvarSr gullskor to reinforce the obviously flagging attempts of 
Gizurr borvaldsson. What we witness in this sequence is mounting 
pressure on the Icelanders to submit to Norwegian rule, and an 
increasing allocation of resources to realize this goal. The gradual 
steps in this escalating sequence date not from 1247 when Cardinal 
William of Sabina gave his consent to the project but from 1220  
when King Hakon tried to enlist Snorri Sturluson. If we try, as a 
thought experiment, to imagine that Sturla borSarson was personally 
responsible for this political campaign in Hakonar saga, we could 
suppose that he is trying to shift the initiative from the self-pro­
moting chieftains in Iceland to the Norwegian king, but that may be 
an overly ingenious hypothesis, and it would certainly contradict the 
clear intention to project a peace-loving king. If Sturla was allowed
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any personal perspective at all, it seems most likely that he wished to 
leave enough indications in place to make it clear that the annexation 
was a Norwegian project. The larger intention that controlled his 
hand was, however, to credit King Hakon with success but at the 
same time to cast his campaign in the most delicate terms and portray 
it as a benefit for Iceland.
The task of extracting history from Hakonar saga turns out not to 
be a straightforward matter but requires a careful weighing of what 
the text says and what the underlying biases are likely to be. In his 
1995 paper Armann Jakobsson took note of Jon Johannesson’s view 
that King Hakon’s wish to bring peace to Iceland was nothing more 
than a pretext (yfirskin). He contended that such a view could not 
be read either out of Islendinga saga or Hakonar saga, “unless one 
takes recourse to the tried and true procedure of reading between the 
lines.”28 The art of reading between the lines without overreading 
between the lines is to be sure a challenge, but some reading between 
the lines to determine the bias is a natural part of any literary task. 
That the bias in Hakonar saga involves a persistent exculpation of 
the king can hardly be doubted.29 That damaging information about 
Icelandic resistance to annexation is being suppressed seems quite 
likely when Hakonar saga tells us (IF 32:204): “ There are many tales 
about the dealings of the jarl [Gizurr] and the Icelanders, which it is 
not necessary to write down in this account.”
Hakonar saga is generally referred to as the last of the original 
Norwegian kings’ sagas, although it was probably followed by Sturla 
ForSarson’s Magnuss saga lagab&tis. The latter is, however, extant 
only in a small fragment that allows no discussion of larger patterns 
(IF 32:271-85). Hakonar saga must therefore be counted as the end 
point, written some thirty years after Heimskringla was completed. 
We may cast a glance backward and ask how this last text compares 
with the earlier kings’ sagas and what sort of continuity it suggests. One 
evident departure from previous Icelandic historical writing from Ari 
Forgilsson down to Heimskringla is an emphatic focus on the present 
rather than an interest in retrieving the past. In this respect Hakonar 
saga imitates Sverris saga rather than the early epitomes or the great 
compendia from ca. 1220  to 1235. Hakonar saga demonstrates no 
interest in the past or how the events described grow out of the past. 
To that extent it is less “ historical.” In the early biographical sagas,
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especially the Olafr sagas, there is an attempt to see the protagonists 
as the heroes of a new system and establish their Christian creden­
tials. In Hakonar saga there is no effort to convey King Hakon’s 
personal religious views or to define his position in the evolving 
Norwegian state. He deals with Rome as he deals with any other 
foreign power. To be sure, he is particularly firm about not abusing 
the privilege of sanctuary in churches, but that is part of the peace- 
loving image that the saga projects. It is a political value rather than 
a religious value.
The opaque quality of Hakon’s religious convictions is matched 
by an equally opaque portrayal of his personality. There is a nice 
description of his playfulness as a child (IF 31:182), but no equivalent 
light is shed on his adult years. We do not know how he relates 
personally to his family or his courtiers. The reader is given the 
impression that it is the idea of kingship that is important, not the 
king’s person.30 This too is a notable departure from the orientation 
of the earlier sagas, in which it was a central concern to reveal what 
kind of an individual a given king was, for better or for worse. Perhaps 
by the time Hakonar saga was written personal portraiture had come 
to be considered too close to personal evaluation or even criticism to 
be allowable. There is a concluding description of Hakon (IF 32:265), 
as there is in Sverris saga, but it is not personally revealing. We 
might surmise that the bureaucratization of Norwegian society in the 
thirteenth century had made the consideration of institutions more 
important than the personalities of the individuals who executed 
state business.
Whatever the explanation, Hakonar saga registers losses as well 
as gains in the evolution of saga writing. The gains are in the area of 
communications, military planning (though not battle descriptions), 
and most particularly in the area of foreign policy and foreign 
initiatives. The losses are more on the literary side of the ledger, 
a loss in the area of narrative and dramatic articulation, a loss in 
personal characterization, a loss of tragic inflections, and a loss in 
the development of dialogue. These losses are particularly evident if 
Hakonar saga is compared to the sagas about early Icelanders, with 
their strong interest in individual character and their cultivation of 
suspense. Suspense is ruled out in Hakonar saga because there must 
be no doubt about the king’s success. In both the handling of the
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succession to the throne and the later contest between King Hakon 
and Jarl Skuli there is much latitude for drama, but in both cases 
the drama is minimized and Hakon’s success becomes a foregone 
conclusion. With a stable kingship came a smoother narrative surface 
and a reduction in the function of literature to raise open questions 
and perceive differing outcomes.

